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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case # 990941-CA
Priority # 2

v.
NICHOLAS D. PHIPPS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant was charged by Information with Contributing to
the Delinquency of a Minor and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a
Class B and Class C Misdemeanor, respectively. Upon inquiry into
having a public defender appointed to represent him, the court
informed him that he did not qualify and, thereafter, Defendant
waived his right to counsel and stood trial without the
assistance of an attorney.

Defendant was convicted on both

counts and sentenced to six months, with all but six days stayed
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $900.
conviction, Defendant appeals.

From that

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 A - 3 (E)

(1953), as amended.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

-1-

Issue 1. Did the trial

court violate

Defendant's

Amendment right

to the assistance

of counsel

court-appointed

counsel

qualified?

when he

Sixth

by denying

him

Standard of Review. The underlying empirical facts regarding
a claim of indigency are reviewable for clear error; the
conclusion as to whether those facts qualify the defendant as
indigent is reviewable for correctness.

State v. Vincent, 883

P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994).

Issue 2. Did the trial
Amendment right
prior

to

court violate

to a jury by failing

Defendant's

Sixth

to inform him of that

right

trial?

Standard of Review.

Whether a trial Court violated

Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury is a mixed question
of law and fact and is reviewed with some deference to the trial
court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about August 16, 1999, the Defendant was charged
by Information with Contributing to the Delinquency of a
Minor and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class B and Class C
Misdemeanor, respectively.

(R0001-0002)

On August: 26,

1999, Defendant appeared in the Seventh District Juvenile
Court

before Honorable Judge S. Don LeBaron en these
-?.

charges.

(R0011) He entered a plea of not guilty and the

matter was set for trial on September 9, 1999.

(R0011) On

August 31, 1999, the Court granted a continuance of the
trial until September 23, 1999. (R0013)
On September 23, 1999, the trial was held in this
matter and a colloquy took place between the Defendant and
Judge LeBaron regarding his desire for self-representation.
(Tr. at pp. 5-11) During said colloquy, the Defendant
inquired as to whether the State would pay for an attorney
for him. (Tr. at p. 10) Judge LeBaron inquired as to how
much the Defendant made per month and was informed it was
approximately $800 per month.

(Tr. at p. 10) Judge LeBaron

inquired as to the Defendant's hourly rate of pay and was
informed it was $6.59 per hour.

(Tr. at p. 10, 11) At the

conclusion of these inquiries, Judge LeBaron informed the
Defendant that he did not qualify for a public defender (Tr.
at p. 11) and the Defendant stood trial without the
assistance of an attorney.
Defendant was found guilty of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling
Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor, and was sentenced

to serve 6 months in the Grand County Jail, with all but six
days stayed, and pay fines in the amount of $900,00.
(R0016-0018) On October 22, 1999, the Defendant filed a pro
se Notice of Appeal regarding this decision. (R0027)
On October 25 and 28, 1999, the Defendant filed
Affidavits of Indigency with the Seventh District Juvenile
Court requesting that a public defender be appointed to
represent him.

(R0021-0026, R0028-0032) On October 28,

1999, based upon the information in the Affidavit of
Indigency filed October 28, 1999, Judge LeBaron found that
the Defendant was indigent and appointed current counsel to
represent the Defendant for purposes of this appeal.
(R0028-0032) On or about March 16, 2000, the Defendant
applied for a Certificate of Probable Cause in this matter.
(See Addendum ^B~)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel was violated in that he was denied his right to courtappointed counsel.

The original position of the Utah Supreme

Court on the issue of "indigency" was maintained under State
v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994) where it

-4-

determined that whether a defendant is indigent is a factintensive inquiry requiring a consideration of the
defendant's entire financial situation.

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated that trial courts making an indigency
determination should consider the defendant's " 'employment
status and earning capacity; financial aid from family or
friends; financial assistance from state and federal
programs; [the defendant's] necessary living expenses and
liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered assets, or any
disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity. '

ff

Id. at 283-4

(citation & footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the
Indigent Defense Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-32-101 TO -704
(1999).

The [Indigent Defense] Act codifies and implements

the procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment.
Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999)
{attached

as Addendum ~ 0 ) .

UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-32-301(1) (1999) requires "...counsel

for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty..."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-32-202 (3) (1999) defines and sets requirements on the
-5-

trial courts for determining whether an individual is
indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel:
(a) "Indigency" means that a person:

(ii) has an income level at or below 150%
of the United States poverty level as
defined by the most recent revised
poverty income guidelines published by
the United States Department of Health
and Human Services;

(b) In making a determination of indigency, the
[trial] court shall
consider:
(i) the probable expense and burden of
defending the case;
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest
in, any tangible or intangible personal
property or real property, or reasonable
expectancy of any such interest;
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the
defendant or that might reasonably be
incurred by the defendant because of
illness or other needs within the
defendant's family;
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of
any dependants; and
(v) other relevant factors.
(emphasis added)
After a simplistic inquiry into the Defendant's earnings,
where the Court failed to follow the requirements of either UTAH
CODE ANN.

§77-32-202 (3) (A) OR (B)(1999), the Court misinformed
-6-

the Defendant that he did not qualify for court-appointed counsel
and, based upon this misinformation, the Defendant waived his
right to counsel and stood trial without the assistance of
counsel.

In a case similar to this one, this simplistic inquiry

was deficient as a matter of law and violated Defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.

Orem City v.

Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999).
Additionally, the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial was violated in that the Court failed to advise
him of his need to make a written demand for a jury in a
non-felony case. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) dictates the following
with regard to this same issue:
When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the
case shall forthwith be set for trial. A
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a
preference for an early trial. In cases other
than felonies the court shall
advise the
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(emphasis added)
The Defendant was not informed at the arraignment or the
trial held in this matter that if he desired to exercise his
right to a jury trial that he must do so in the form of a written
demand.

The court violated the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial by failing to advise him of such.

-7-

ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI sets forth the following:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of counsel for his defence [sic].
A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 (Utah 1999).

If an

accused is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed
counsel. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998).
"The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be
jealously protected by the trial Court." Id.,accord
v.

Wainwright,

Gideon

372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9

L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (stating "in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into Court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
-8-

counsel is provided him").

The Sixth Amendment embodies a

realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel.

That which is

simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer--to the
untrained layman--may appear intricate, complex, and
mysterious.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct.1019,

1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

"The denial of the

constitutional right to counsel requires

reversal."

In re

W.B.J,. 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (emphasis
added).
The original position of the Utah Supreme Court on the
issue of "indigency" was maintained under State v. Vincent,
883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994) where it determined that
whether a defendant is indigent is a fact-intensive inquiry
requiring a consideration of the defendant's entire
financial situation.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated

that trial courts making an indigency determination should
consider the defendant's " 'employment status and earning
-9-

capacity; financial aid from family or friends; financial
assistance from state and federal programs; [the
defendant's] necessary living expenses and liabilities; [the
defendant's] unencumbered assets, or any disposition
thereof, and borrowing capacity.f " Id. at 283-4 (citation &
footnotes omitted) (alterations in original) .
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the
Indigent Defense Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-32-101 TO -704
(1999).

The [Indigent Defense] Act codifies and implements

the procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment.
Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999)
{attached

as Addendum ~ 0 ) .

UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-32-301(1) (1999) requires "...counsel

for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty..."

UTAH CODS ANN.

§77-32-202 (3) (1999) defines and sets requirements on the
trial courts for determining whether an individual is
indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel:
(a) "Indigency" means that a person:

(ii) has an income level at or below 150%
-10-

of the United States poverty level as
defined by the most recent revised
poverty income guidelines published by
the United States Department of Health
and Human Services;

(b) In making a determination of indigency, the
[trial] court shall
consider:
(i) the probable expense and burden of
defending the case;
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest
in, any tangible or intangible personal
property or real property, or reasonable
expectancy of any such interest;
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the
defendant or that might reasonably be
incurred by the defendant because of
illness or other needs within the
defendantf s family;
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of
any dependants; and
(v) other relevant factors.
(emphasis added)
Orem City v. Bergstrom 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999)
{attached

as Addendum ~ C ~ ) , illustrates as follows the

importance of following the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-32-202 (1998) in determining whether a Defendant is
indigent in order for a trial court to "jealously protect"
an individual's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel:
-11-

. . .Section 77-32-202 "squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional
and [statutory] requirements are complied with."
State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)
(guilty plea context).
In this case, the trial Court considered none of
the factors articulated in Vincent
or in Section
77-32-202 of the [Indigent Defense] Act. We
therefore hold that the trial court's inquiry into
Bergstrom's claim of indigence was deficient
as a

matter of law and violated
his Sixth
right to the assistance
of counsel.

Amendment
Accordingly,

we reverse and remand for a new trial.
(emphasis added)
In a Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the
Courts, staff attorney Peggy Gentles details the most recent
United States Department of Health and Human Services
poverty guidelines which were issued February 24, 1998 (63
Fed. Reg. 9235) (See Addendum ~ D ~ ) .

Under this guideline,

one individual with no dependants is considered "indigent"
if he or she makes $12,075 per year or $1,006 or less per
month.
In this case, the trial court failed to follow the
requirements of Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975
(Utah App. 1999) and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202 (1998), in
determining whether Defendant was indigent; and, based upon

-12-

that failure, misinformed Defendant that he did not qualify
for court-appointed counsel.

(Tr. at pp. 5-11)

As shown

under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3) (A) (II) (1998), the Defendant
did qualify according to the information he provided to the
trial court.
In the midst of the court's colloquy with the Defendant
regarding self-representation, the following dialogue took
place regarding the issue of whether the Defendant was
indigent and entitled to a court-appointed attorney:
MR. PHIPPS
THE COURT:
MR. PHIPPS
THE
MR.
THE
MR.
THE

COURT:
PHIPPS:
COURT:
PHIPPS:
COURT:

MR. PHIPPS:

THE COURT:
MR. PHIPPS:
THE COURT:
MR. PHIPPS:
THE COURT:
MR. PHIPPS:
THE COURT:
MR. PHIPPS:

Can I ask a question?
Yes.
If I get an attorney, does the State
pay for it, or do I?
Well, it depends on if you qualify.
Well, how much is to qualify?
How much do you make a month?
Maybe 800 to 1,000.
Does it average 800 or 1,000, or
900?
It varies in between, depending on
how many hours I get that month-that week.
How much did you make last year?
I'm not really sure. My--I was out
of state at the time.
Do you work a 40-hour week?
I do, and then I also work at Pasta
Jay 1 s.
Okay. Give me an average monthly
salary, gross.
I would say 800.
Eight hundred a month?
Uh-huh. Eight hundred a month—800
-13-

THE
MR.
THE
MR.
THE
MR.
THE
MR.
THE

COURT:
PHIPPS:
COURT:
PHIPPS:
COURT:
PHIPPS:
COURT:
PHIPPS:
COURT:

a week (inaudible).
Eight hundred a week?
Yeah, I'm sorry, 800 a month, yeah.
How much do you make an hour?
Six fifty-nine an hour.
And you work a 40-hour week?
Uh-huh, or at least try.
What was that again, hourly rate?
Six fifty-nine an hour.
You don't qualify for a public
defender. . .

(Tr. at pp. 10-11)
The court should have recognized that Defendant
qualified under UTAH CODE ANN, §77-32-202(3)(A) in that he
reportedly makes less than 150% of the poverty guidelines
set forth by the most recently revised poverty income
guidelines published by the United States Department of
Health and Human Services. (See Addendum ~ D ~ ) .

A Defendant

claiming indigency who is charged with a crime the penalty
of which is less than a class A misdemeanor is not required
to comply with submitting a complete written affidavit of
indigency.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-32-202(2) (A) AND (B) . However,

after having been denied court-appointed counsel previously
upon his oral request, Defendant later submitted his request
in writing twice. (R0021-0026, R0028-0032).
In overlooking UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3)(A), the court
-14-

should have, at a minimum, followed the requirements of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§77-32-202(3) (B) and inquired of the Defendant or

taken into consideration ". . .(i) the probable expense and
burden of defending the case; (ii) the ownership of, or any
interest in, any tangible or intangible personal property or
real property, or reasonable expectancy of any such
interest; (iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant
or that might reasonably be incurred by the defendant
because of illness or other needs within the defendant's
family; (iv) number, ages, and relationships of any
dependants; and (v) other relevant factors."

The court did

not probe the Defendant for any information regarding these
factors in the colloquy.

(Tr. at pp. 10-11)

The court

itself appears to have recognized this error one month
following the trial on this matter when it found Defendant
to be indigent and appointed counsel herein for purposes of
this appeal. (R0028-0032)
As with Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah
App. 1999), the trial court's inquiry into the Defendant's
claim of indigence at trial here was deficient as a matter
of law and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the

-15-

assistance of counsel in that the court failed to follow the
requirements of either UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3) (A) or (B)
in determining Defendant's indigency.

As such, the matter

should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
II.

THE COURT VIOLATED DEPENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO A JURY

The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure originally
dictated in UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-17(D) , as amended (1982 ed.)
(repealed) set forth the entitlement of a jury trial for
cases other than felonies:
All other cases shall be tried without a jury
unless the defendant makes written demand at least
ten days prior to trial, or the Court orders
otherwise. . .
After said statute was repealed and replaced by the
Rules, UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) dictated the following with
regard to this same issue:
When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the
case shall forthwith be set for trial. A
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a
preference for an early trial. In cases other
than felonies the court shall
advise the
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(emphasis added)
On August 26, 1999, the Defendant appeared before Judge
-16-

LeBaron for an arraignment on Contributing to the
Delinquency of Minors, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling
Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor.

(R0011)

The

Minutes, Order and Decree from said hearing indicate that,
"The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule
18 of the Juvenile Court Rules and Procedures."

{See

Addendum ~E~) The Defendant then entered a plea of not
guilty and the matter was initially scheduled for trial for
September 9, 1999. (R0011)
UTAH

notice".

R. JUV. P. 18 governs "Summons; service of process;
Rule 18 does not set forth anything with regard to

the court's requirement under UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) to inform
the Defendant of the " . . . requirements for making a
written demand for a jury trial."

According to the Minute

entry, the court failed to inform the Defendant of his right
to a jury at either the hearing held August 26, 1999, or
prior to the trial held September 23, 1999. (R0011, R00160018, Tr. at pp. 1-32).
In State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam), the defendant was charged with a felony, but
convicted of a misdemeanor and never made a waiver of a jury
-17-

trial on the record; however, the prosecutor asked for and
was granted a nonjury trial.

The Utah Supreme Court stated

that they will not presume a waiver of a jury trial from a
"silent record."

Id. They further stated that, "A criminal

defendant's right to a jury trial is substantial and
valuable and should be carefully safeguarded by our courts."
Id. In this case, the Defendant never made a waiver of his
right to a jury as he was never informed of said right by
the trial court to have one.
In State v. Garteiz, 688 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah 1984),
Justice Durham explained in her concurrence, "There are
presently no explicit procedural safeguards in our courts,
no protective devices to assure that defendants understand
what a jury's function is and that their right to a jury
trial can in no way be abrogated without their full,
informed consent."

By failing to inform the Defendant of

his right to a jury, this court did not allow Defendant the
chance to give "full, informed consent" and therefore
violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by
proceeding to trial without having done so and without
having obtained a waiver from Defendant of his right.
-18-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant
respectfully requests that this Court enter an order
reversing the trial court's decision and remand the matter
to the trial court for a new trial to be held in the matter
DATED THIS 16rtl day of March, 2000.

Happy J. Morgan
Atxorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 16th day of March,
2000, I caused to be served two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief by first-class postage prepaid mail to the following:
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

J. Morgan
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Addendum ~A~

$ c p 2 7 1QQQ

SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT SEV^ - - - FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUVE^i. ;

MINUTES, ORDER AND
DECREE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs

Case No.: 977430

NICHOLAS PHIPPS
Defendant
Tape:

J99-34-Video

Counter:

Court is in Session:

September 23, 1999

Type & Charge:

Present:

13:40

#001 -Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors
#002-Selling Tobacco to a Minor

Nicholas Phipps; Lisa Carter, Probation Officer; Clark Messick, Bailiff;
Claudia Page, Clerk: S. Don LeBaron, Judge.

This matter came before the Court for trial on a petition filed herein alleging the above
allegations.
State calls Officer Eddie Guerrero who is sworn and examined.
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules
and Procedures. Defendant waives his rights to an attorney.
State calls Jordan Batwinas who is sworn and examined. Mr. Phipps cross examines the
witness.
State rests
Nicholas Phipps calls Vinnie Phipps who is sworn and examined. State voir dires witness.
Nicholas Phipps is sworn and gives testimony. Mr. Benge cross examines the witness.
Redirect by Mr. Phipps.
Defense rests.
Mr. Benge gives closing.
Mr. Phipps gives closing.

-

MINUTES, ORDER AND DECREE
DATE:
SEPTEMBER 23,1999
CASE NAME AND NUMBER:
#977430-NICHOLAS PHIPPS
PAGE 2

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
The Court found the parties understood and knowingly and intelligently waived the above
rights. Incidents #001 and #002 are found to be true, beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the
evidence presented to the court. Further, that said defendant comes within the provisions of the
Juvenile Court Act.
Ms. Carter recommends fines and fees totaling $1,075.00 and 6 months in jail with all but
5 days of the jail time suspended.
NOWTHEREFORE AS DISPOSITION FOR INCIDENTS #001-CONTRIBUTING
TO THE DELINQUENCY OF MINORS AND #002-SELLING TOBACCO TO A MINOR,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
That Nicholas pay a fine plus surcharge of $900.00 at the rate of SI 00 per month with the
first payment due by October 23, 1999. Payments are to be made to the Seventh District Juvenile
Court, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah, 84532.
That Nicholas be committed to the Grand County Jail for 6 months with all but 6 days
stayed. Defendant is to begin serving the 6 days on 3 consecutive weekends beginning September
24, 1999, at 5:00 p.m.
That Nicholas not make any direct nor indirect contact with Jordan Batwinas nor his family.
Failure to comply with the order of this Court may result in your being found in contempt,
loss of driver's license, forfeiture of income tax refund and could result in additional penalties and/or
a commitment to jail.
You have the right to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Appeals must be filed within
30 days.
Dated this 23rd day of September, 1999.
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Copies mailed/hand delivered/faxed this ^{jf^ day of September, 1999,
William L. Benge, County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah.
Nicholas Phipps, 748 Westwood, Moab, Utah, 84532

By_CAo^Ao^
Deputy Court Clerk

^L.

Addendum ~B~

HAPPY J. MORGAN, Bar # ( 7586)
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Nicholas D. Phipps
8 South 100 East
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (435)259-9418
Facsimile: (435) 259-3979

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

;)
;)

APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE

v.

])

Case # 977430

NICHOLAS D. PHIPPS,
Defendant,

;
])

JUDGE MANLY

COMES NOW Nicholas D. Phipps, by and through counsel Happy J. Morgan, pursuant
to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann §77-20-10 (1995), and
requests this Court issue a Certificate of Probable Cause and order the Defendant's sentence
stayed pending the outcome of the appeal from his conviction subject to the least restrictive
conditions reasonably necessary to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-20-10 (1995).
The Defendant requests that a ruling on his application be held within ten (10) days after
this Court receives the State's reply, or if no reply is filed, within fifteen (15) days after the filing
date of this application as required by Rule 27(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Defendant bases this Application for Certificate of Probable Cause on the grounds
set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law.
DATED THIS 16th day of March, 2000.

liaDDV J. Morsan
Attorney for Defendant

?

HAPPY J. MORGAN, Bar # ( 7586)
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Nicholas D. Phipps
8 South 100 East
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (435)259-9418
Facsimile: (435) 259-3979

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

;)
;)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE

v.

])

Case # 977430

NICHOLAS D. PHIPPS,
Defendant,

]
;)

JUDGE MANLY

COMES NOW Nicholas D. Phipps by and through counsel Happy J. Morgan and submits
this Memorandum in Support of Application for Certificate of Probable Cause.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about August 16, 1999, the Defendant was charged by Information with
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class B and Class
C Misdemeanor, respectively. On August 26, 1999, Defendant appeared in the Seventh District
Juvenile Court before Honorable Judge S. Don LeBaron on these charges. He entered a plea of

not guilty and the matter was set for trial on September 9, 1999. On August 31, 1999, the Court
granted a continuance of the trial until September 23, 1999.
On September 23, 1999, the trial was held in this matter and a colloquy took place
between the Defendant and Judge LeBaron regarding his desire for self-representation. During
said colloquy, the Defendant inquired as to whether the State would pay for an attorney for him.
Judge LeBaron inquired as to how much the Defendant made per month and was informed it was
approximately $800 per month. Judge LeBaron inquired as to the Defendant's hourly rate of pay
and was informed it was $6.59 per hour. At the conclusion of these inquiries, Judge LeBaron
informed the Defendant that he did not qualify for a public defender and the Defendant stood
trial without the assistance of an attorney. Defendant was found guilty of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C
Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to serve 6 months in the Grand County Jail, with all but six
days stayed, and pay fines in the amount of S900.00. On October 22, 1999, the Defendant filed a
pro se Notice of Appeal regarding this decision.
On October 25 and 28, 1999, the Defendant filed Affidavits of Indigency with the
Seventh District Juvenile Court requesting that a public defender be appointed to represent him.
On October 28, 1999, based upon the information in the Affidavit of Indigency filed October 28,
1999, Judge LeBaron found that the Defendant was indigent and appointed current counsel to
represent the Defendant. Said Appeal is currently pending in the Utah Court of Appeals (case#

990941-C A). The Defendant has not previously applied for a Certificate of Probable Cause in
this matter.
ARGUMENT
A CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE SHOULD
BE ISSUED WHERE A NEW TRIAL IS LIKELY
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-20-10(1) states the following:

The court shall order that a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail or prison, and who has filed an appeal
or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the Court finds:
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in:
(i) reversal;
(ii) an order for a new trial; or
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in jail
or prison;
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose of delay; and
(c) by clear and convincing evidence presented by the defendant that he is not
likely to flee the jurisdiction of the Court, and will not pose a danger to the
physical, psychological, or financial and economic safety or well-being of any
other person or the community if released.
Defendant appeals to the Utah Court of Appeal on the issues of (1) whether his Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated; and (2) whether his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury was violated. Both issues presented are mixed questions of fact and
law and are reviewed with some deference to the trial Court. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah
1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

3

THE COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANTS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant believes that he will prevail on the appeal in this matter and that a new trial is
likely to occur. This notion is based upon the fact that the Court failed to follow the
requirements of Orem City v. Bergstrom. 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) and UTAH CODE
ANN. §77-32-202 (1998), in determining whether Defendant was indigent and, based upon that
failure, misinformed Defendant that he did not qualify for Court-appointed counsel. Orem City
v. Bergstrom. 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) illustrated the error of this Court in failing to
follow the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202 (1998) under the circumstances in this
case:
A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution (FN2) See State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808
(Utah 1999). "If an accused is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel."
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). "The right to have the assistance
of counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be
jealously protected by the trial Court." Id.; accord Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (stating "in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into Court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided him"). The Sixth
Amendment embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained layman-may appear
intricate, complex, and mysterious. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462063, 58
S.Ct.1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
. . ."The denial of the constitutional right to counsel requires reversal." In re
4

W.B.J., 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct.App. 1998).. .
.. ."Determining whether a defendant [is indigent] is a fact-intensive inquiry,"
requiring a consideration of the defendant's entire financial situation. State v.
Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994). Our supreme court has stated that
courts making an indigency determination should consider the defendant's "
'employment status and earning capacity; financial aid from family or friends;
financial assistance from state and federal programs; [the defendant's] necessary
living expenses and liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered assets, or any
disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity.'" Id. at 283-4 (citation & footnotes
omitted) (alterations in original).
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the Indigent Defense Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-32-101 to -704 fl999)(the Act). The Act codifies and
implements the procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. See
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-301(1) (1999) (requiring "counsel for each indigent who
faces the substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty").
The Act further details the necessary inquiry into a criminal defendant's claim of
indigence. When a defendant has asked for court-appointed counsel, the [trial]
court shall consider:
(i) the probable expense and burden of defending the case;
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or intangible
personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of any
such interest;
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant or that might
reasonably be incurred by the defendant because of illness or other
needs within the defendant's family;
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of any dependants; and
(v) other relevant factors.
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-202(3)(b) (1999) (emphasis added). Section 77-32-202
"squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and
[statutory] requirements are complied with." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1312 (Utah 1987) (guilty plea context).
In this case, the trial Court considered none of the factors articulated in Vincent or
in Section 77-32-202 of the Act. We therefore hold that the trial court's inquiry
into Bergstrom's claim of indigence was deficient as a matter of law and violated
5

his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for a new trial.
Additionally, though not enumerated in Orem City v. Bengstrom. Utah Code Ann. §7732-202(3)(b) states that, "'Indigency' means that a person: .. .has an income level at or below
150% of the United States poverty level as defined by the most recent revised poverty income
guidelines published by the United States Department of Health and Human Services; .. ." In a
Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the Courts, Peggy Gentles details the most
recent HHS poverty guidelines which were issued February 24, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 9235) (See
Exhibit ~A~). Under this guideline, one individual with no dependants is considered "indigent"
if he or she makes $12,075 per year or $1,006 or less per month. As shown in the proceeding
paragraph, the Defendant did qualify according to the information he provided to Judge LeBaron.
Proceeding the court's colloquy with the Defendant regarding self-representation, the
following dialogue took place regarding the issue of whether the Defendant was indigent and
entitled to a court-appointed attorney:
MR. PHIPPS: Can I ask a question?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PHIPPS: If I get an attorney, does the State pay for it, or do I?
THE COURT: Well, it depends on if you qualify.
MR. PHIPPS: Well, how much is to qualify?
THE COURT: How much do you make a month?
MR. PHIPPS: Maybe 800 to 1,000.
THE COURT: Does it average 800 or 1,000, or 900?
MR. PHIPPS: It varies in between, depending on how many hours I get that
month—that week.
THE COURT: How much did you make last year?
6

MR. PHIPPS: I'm not really sure. My-I was out of state at the time.
THE COURT: Do you work a 40-hour week?
MR. PHIPPS: I do, and then I also work at Pasta Jay's.
THE COURT: Okay. Give me an average monthly salary, gross.
MR. PHIPPS: I would say 800.
THE COURT: Eight hundred a month?
MR. PHIPPS: Uh-huh. Eight hundred a month-800 a week (inaudible).
THE COURT: Eight hundred a week?
MR. PHIPPS: Yeah, I'm sorry, 800 a month, yeah.
THE COURT: How much do you make an hour?
MR. PHIPPS: Six fifty-nine an hour.
THE COURT: And you work a 40-hour week?
MR. PHIPPS: Uh-huh, or at least try.
THE COURT: What was that again, hourly rate?
MR. PHIPPS: Six fifty-nine an hour.
THE COURT: You don't qualify for a public defender.
Besides the fact that the Defendant qualified under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3)(A)
as argued previously, it is obvious by this dialogue that the Court failed to follow the
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3)(B) in considering ".. .(i) the probable expense
and burden of defending the case; (ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or
intangible personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of any such interest; (iii)
the amounts of debts owned by the defendant or that mieht reasonablv be incurred bv the
defendant because of illness or other needs within the defendant's family; (iv) number, ages, and
relationships of any dependants; and (v) other relevant factors." The court must have recognized
the consequences of its failure to abide by these requirements nearly one month following the
trial on this matter when it found Defendant to be indigent and appointed counsel herein.
Accordingly, the trial Court's inquiry into the Defendant's claim of indigence was deficient as a
7

matter of law and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
THE COURT VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO A JURY
UTAH

R. CRIM. P. 11(D) states the following:

When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early
trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(emphasis added)
On August 26, 1999, the Defendant appeared before Judge LeBaron for an arraignment
on Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling Tobacco to a
Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor. The Minutes, Order and Decree from said hearing indicate that,
"The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules and
Procedures." (See Exhibit ~~B~) The Defendant then entered a plea of not guilty and the matter
was initially scheduled for trial for September 9, 1999. UTAH R. Juv. P. 18 governs "Summons;
service of process; notice". An analysis of Rule 18 does not set forth anything with regard to the
court's requirement under UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) to inform the Defendant of the "..
.requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial." The Court failed to inform the
Defendant of his right to a jury at either the hearing held August 26, 1999, or at the trial held
September 23, 1999.
In State v. Garteiz. 688 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah 1984), Justice Durham explained in her
8

concurrence, "There are presently no explicit procedural safeguards in our courts, no protective
devices to assure that defendants understand what a jury's function is and that their right to a jury
trial can in no way be abrogated without their full, infonned consent." By failing to inform the
Defendant of his right to a jury, this court did not allow Defendant the chance to give "full,
informed consent" and therefore violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by
proceeding to trial without having done so.
CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court
enter an order granting this Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and order that
Defendant's sentence be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in this matter.
DATED THIS 16th day of March, 2000.

Happy 3. Morgan
Attorney for Nicholas D. Phipps
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on this /^L day of t*fti2 . 2000,1 sent by first-class mail, postageprepaid, a true and correct copy of the above Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and
Memorandum in Support to the following parties:
Mr. William L. Benge
125 East Center Street
Moab,Utah 84532

.—
/
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Daniel J. Becker
State Court Administrator
Myron K. March
Deputy Court Administrator

Chief Justice Michael D. Zimmerman
Chair Utah Judicial Council

MEMORANDUM
From:

To:

District Court Judges
Juvenile Court Judges
Justice Court Judges
Trial Court Executives
Clerks of Court
S u bj ect: P overty Guidelines

Peggy Gentles, Staff A t t o m ^ X ^

Date:

March 2, 1998

Under Utah Code 8 77-32-202(3)(a), for purposes of appointment of counsel in criminal cases, the
definition of indigency
includes "has an income level at or betow 150% of the United States poverrv level
as defined by thewmost recemlv revised poverrv income guidelines published by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services." The most'recent HPiS povertv guidelines were issued
Feoruary 24, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 9235). The following table contains 150% of the poverty guidelines for
varvins family sizes.
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AUG 2 6 1999
SEVENTH DISTRICT
JUVENILE COURT

SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MINUTES, ORDER AND
DECREE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs

Case No.: 977430

NICHOLAS PHIPPS
Defendant
Tape:

J99-31-VIDEO

Counter:

Court is in Session:

August 26, 1999

Type & Charge:

#001-Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors
#002-Selling Tobacco to a Minor

Present:

10:07

Defendant Peggy Phipps, Mother; Lisa Carter, Probation Officer; Clark
Messick, Bailiff; Claudia Page. Clerk; S. Don LeBaron, Judge.

This matter came before the Court for arraignment on a petition filed herein alleging the
above allegations.
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules
and Procedures.
Defendant denies the incident and same is set for trial on September 9, 1999, at 1:30 p.m.
Dated this 26th day of August, 1999.
BY THE COURT:
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1999 WL 1079975, Orem City v. Bergstrom, (Utah App. 1999)
*1079975
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT
BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT
LAW
REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
OREM CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Travis L. BERGSTROM, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 981690-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 2, 1999.
Brett J, Delporto and Gregory G. Skordas, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f 5 " A district court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial."
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998).
Bergstrom contends the trial court erred by
determining that he was not indigent and denying him
court-appointed counsel, and that this error warrants a
new trial. "[T]he underlying empirical facts regarding
[a] claim of indigency are reviewable for clear error;
the conclusion as to whether those facts qualify the
defendant as indigent is reviewable for correctness."
State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994).
Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of
Bergstrom's appeal, we need not address his
remaining arguments.

Robert J. Church, Orem, for Appellee
ANALYSIS
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and JACKSON.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
**1
court's
Motion
remand

If 1 Travis L. Bergstrom appeals the trial
denial of his Motion for a New Trial and
for Arrest of Judgment. We reverse and
for a new trial.

BACKGROUND
If 2 Bergstrom was charged with stalking, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-106.5 (1999). At his arraignment, Bergstrom
asked the trial court what he must do to secure a
public defender. After asking about Bergstrom's age
and employment, the trial court denied Bergstrom's
request for court-appointed counsel. (FN1)
U 3 Bergstrom then proceeded to prepare for trial
pro se. He made a timely discovery request to Orem
City (the City), dated April 24, 1998. However, the
City did not respond to Bergstrom's discovery request
until after the trial, which was held on June 8, 1998.
Bergstrom represented himself at the bench trial, and
presented two wimesses.
He was convicted of
stalking and sentenced to six months in jail, with all
but fourteen days suspended.
1f 4 Shortly after the trial, Bergstrom hired an
attorney and moved for a new trial or for an arrest of
the judgment. The trial court denied those motions,
and Bergstrom now appeals.

% 6 Bergstrom argues that the trial court failed to
comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for
determining whether a defendant is indigent, and this
error requires reversal. The City counters that
Bergstrom had the burden of proving his indigence,
and that he failed to carry that burden.
| 7 A criminal defendant's right to counsel is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (FN2) See State v. Bakalov, 979
P.2d 799, 808 (Utah 1999). "If an accused is
indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel."
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998).
"The right to have the assistance of counsel in a
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right
which must be jealously protected by the trial court."
Id.; accord Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (stating
"in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him"). The Sixth Amendment
**2 embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious
truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life
or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned counsel. That which is
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer-to the
untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct.
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1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
If 8 "However, the right to appointed counsel is not
absolute.... When a defendant is charged with a
misdemeanor crime, counsel is not necessarily
guaranteed." Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655,
658 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert,
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997), and cert, denied,
523 U.S. 1125, 118 S.Ct. 1811 (1998). Rather, the
right to counsel for a defendant charged with a
misdemeanor attaches only if the court determines,
pretrial, to impose jail time. See Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 369, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1160, 59 L.Ed.2d 383
(1979); Agersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40, 92
S.Ct. 2006, 2014, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). In this
case, Bergstrom was sentenced to serve fourteen days
of a six-month sentence. Thus, his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was implicated. (FN3) "The denial of
the constitutional right to counsel requires reversal."
In re W.B.J., 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct.App. 1998).
Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial
court properly denied Bergstrom's request for
appointed counsel. If not, we must reverse.
^ 9 The record shows that the court considered only
two facts pertinent to Bergstrom's claim of indigence:
his age and his employment status. This inquiry does
not begin to meet the degree of scrutiny necessary to
protect the fundamental right to the assistance of
counsel.
"Determining whether a defendant [is
indigent] is a fact-intensive inquiry," requiring a
consideration of the defendant's entire financial
situation. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah
1994). Our supreme court has stated that courts
making an indigency determination should consider
the defendant's " 'employment status and earning
capacity; financial aid from family or friends;
financial assistance from state and federal programs;
[the defendant's] necessary living expenses and
liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered assets, or
any disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity.' "
Id. at 283-84 (citation & footnotes omitted)
(alterations in original).
1 10 After Vincent was decided, our legislature
enacted the Indigent Defense Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
77-32-101 to -704 (1999) (the Act). The Act codifies
and implements the procedural protections afforded by
the Sixth Amendment.
See Utah Code Ann. §
77-32-301(1) (1999) (requiring "counsel for each
indigent who faces the substantial probability of the
deprivation of the indigent's liberty").
**3

T| 11 The Act further details the necessary

inquiry into a criminal defendant's claim of indigence.
When a defendant has asked for court-appointed
counsel,
the [trial] court shall consider:
(i) the probable expense and burden of defending
the case;
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any
tangible or intangible personal property or real
property, or reasonable expectancy of any such
interest;
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant
or that might reasonably be incurred by the
defendant because of illness or other needs within
the defendant's family;
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of any
dependents; and
(v) other relevant factors.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(3)(b) (1999) (emphasis
added). Section 77-32-202 "squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and
[statutory] requirements are complied with." State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) (guilty
plea context).
^ 12 In this case, the trial court considered none of
the factors articulated in Vincent or in Section
77-32-202 of the Act. We therefore hold that the trial
court's inquiry into Bergstrom's claim of indigence
was deficient as a matter of law and violated his Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
K 13 Because this issue has not appeared before our
courts, but is likely to in the future, "a statement of
the law concerning [indigency determinations under
section 77-32-202] in all trial courts in this state is
appropriate." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (providing
similar guidance regarding guilty pleas). When a
criminal defendant who faces the threat of actual
incarceration asks for court-appointed counsel, it is
the court's duty to advise the defendant of the
financial information it needs to properly evaluate the
claim of indigence.
U 14 Providing a defendant with a written form
would ensure that the defendant clearly understands
what information the court needs to evaluate a claim
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1999 WL 1079975, Orem City v. Bergstrom, (Utah App. 1999)
of indigence. The affidavits of indigence currently in
use, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(2)(a)
(1999) (requiring defendants charged with\ class A
misdemeanor or felony to file affidavit "containing]
the factual information required in this section and by
the court"), or some similar financial statement form
would serve this purpose well. (FN4) Once the
defendant has been advised what information he or
she must provide, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to supply this information. See Vincent,
883P.2dat283.
1f 15 "This procedure may take additional time, but
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name
of judicial economy. The procedure outlined is
designed to assist trial judges in making the
constitutionally required determination" whether a
defendant is truly indigent and deserving of courtappointed counsel. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. The
fundamental right to counsel deserves all practical
safeguards to protect it, and we feel it prudent to err
on the side of caution.
Other Issues Raised on Appeal
**4. | 16 Because we hold that the trial court's error
was harmful as a matter of law and warrants reversal,
we need not determine whether the other claimed
errors were harmful, or whether we should invoke the
doctrine of cumulative error. See State v. Heat on,
958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998) (declining to address
other arguments raised on appeal because improper
waiver of right to counsel "is dispositive").
CONCLUSION
t 17 The trial court erred as a matter of law when it
determined that Bergstrom was not indigent based
solely on his age and employment status. This error
affected Bergstrom's Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.
H 18 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Judge, JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge
FN1. The actual exchange was as follows:
BERGSTROM: How do I go about receiving [a]
public defender? I can't afford an attorney.

THE COURT: How old are you, Mr. Bergstrom?
BERGSTROM: 30 years old, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. And do you have a job?
BERGSTROM: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And I'm going to deny your request
for appointment of counsel. You're an adult male.
You're 30 years old. You're old enough to make a
living for yourself, and I assume you're old enough
to retain an attorney. So if you will see the clerk,
she'll give you a copy of that order.
FN2. The Sixth Amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
U.S. Const, amend. VI.
FN3. It makes no difference in our analysis that a
municipality-rather than the State or federal
government-is the prosecuting entity. See City of
St. George v. Smith, 828 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah
Ct.App.1992).
FN4. We note that a defendant such as Bergstrom,
who was charged with a class B misdemeanor, need
not actually file the affidavit with the court. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(2)(b) (1999).
Nonetheless, establishing a uniform procedure that
does not differentiate among defendants will make
the trial court's job in this respect easier. Whether
the defendant is required to formally file the
affidavit or not, providing the affidavit or some
similar form is a simple way for the court to gather
the information required by our case law and
statutes.
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MEMORANDUM
To:

District Court Judees
Juvenile Court Judges
Justice Court Judges
Trial Court Executives
Clerks of Court

Subject:

Poverty Guidelines

From:

Peggy Gentles, Staff Attorn^jS^

Date:

March 2, 1998

Under Utah Code 8 77-32-202(3)(a), for purposes of appointment of counsel in criminal cases, the
definition of indigency includes "has an income level at or below 150% of the United States poverty level
as defined by the~most recently revised poverrv income guidelines published by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services." The most recent HHS poverty guidelines were issued
February 24, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 9235). The following table contains 150% of the poverty guidelines for
varying family sizes.
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NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS
150% OF POVERTY GUIDELINE

1

$12,075
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516,275
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520,475
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$24,675
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5

$28,875

6

$33,075
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7

$37,275
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8

$41,475
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For every family member over eight add

$4,200
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SEVENTH DISTRICT
JUVENILE COURT

SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MINUTES, ORDER AND
DECREE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs

Case No.: 977430

NICHOLAS PHIPPS
Defendant
Tape:

J99-31-VIDEO

Counter:

Court is in Session:

August 26, 1999

Type & Charge:

#001-Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors
#002-Selling Tobacco to a Minor

Present:

10:07

Defendant Peggy Phipps, Mother; Lisa Carter, Probation Officer; Clark
Messick, Bailiff; Claudia Page, Clerk; S. Don LeBaron, Judge.

This matter came before the Court for arraignment on a petition filed herein alleging the
above allegations.
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules
and Procedures.
Defendant denies the incident and same is set for trial on September 9,1999, at 1:30 p.m.
Dated this 26th day of August, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

